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BUY IT NOW: ESTABLISHING PERSONAL JURISDICTION
OVER OUT-OF-STATE DEFENDANTS WHO CONDUCT
BUSINESS THROUGH ONLINE INTERMEDIARIES
Chris Rojao

*

I. INTRODUCTION
According to the United States Census Bureau, in 2008, ecommerce retail sales accounted for approximately 3.6% of all retail
1
sales in the country and generated $142 billion in revenue. A study
by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) estimates that in the same year, approximately 73% of all
electronic retail sales were conducted through online retail
2
intermediaries (“online intermediaries”).
Online intermediaries
facilitate Internet transactions for new and used goods by connecting
buyers with suppliers, and they provide a range of services such as a
3
platform for auctions, fixed prices, and transaction processing. One
4
of the largest online intermediaries is eBay.com. In June 2011, 223.5
million people accounting for 16.2% of the world’s Internet
5
population visited eBay. The increasing use of the Internet and
online intermediaries—like eBay—by manufacturers and sellers to
distribute their products across the United States has posed
significant problems for courts in determining where these

*
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1
E-Stats, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 1 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/econ
/estats/2009/2009reportfinal.pdf.
2
KARINE PERSET, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., THE ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL ROLE OF INTERNET INTERMEDIARIES 7 (2010), available at http://www.oecd.org
/dataoecd/49/4/44949023.pdf.
3
See id. at 12.
4
See Dan Rowinski, Amazon’s Websites Saw 20% of the World’s Internet Users in June,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/external/readwriteweb/2011
/08/17/17readwriteweb-amazons-websites-saw-20-of-the-worlds-inter-48335.html.
5
Id.

1075

ROJAO (DO NOT DELETE)

1076

5/28/2013 2:02 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:1075

manufacturers and sellers should be subject to personal jurisdiction
when conflicts arise out of their transactions.
State and federal courts have struggled with applying the
traditional personal jurisdiction analysis and the other specialized test
for establishing personal jurisdiction over the Internet, the Zippo test,
6
to Internet transactions through online intermediaries.
This
Comment analyzes the various approaches to establishing personal
jurisdiction over businesses and individuals that conduct business
through online intermediaries. Part II discusses the development
and expansion of personal jurisdiction from Pennoyer v. Neff to
International Shoe Co. v. Washington to World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson. Part III explains how some courts have applied these
traditional principles to personal jurisdiction with regard to Internet
activity and how others have developed a specialized test for personal
jurisdiction with regard to Internet activity. Part IV illustrates the
problems that courts have faced in applying both the traditional
principles of personal jurisdiction and the Zippo test for personal
jurisdiction to out-of-state defendants that conduct business through
online intermediaries by analyzing relevant case law on the issue.
Part V establishes a new “online intermediaries test” that combines
important elements of the Zippo test and the traditional minimum
contacts analysis and is specifically tailored to Internet transactions
conducted through online intermediaries. Part VI applies this new
“online intermediaries test” to actual and hypothetical scenarios in
order to demonstrate its practicality. Part VII concludes, urging
courts to adopt this approach.
II. CREATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINAL TEST FOR
ESTABLISHING PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is defined as “a government’s general power to
7
exercise its authority over all persons and things within its territory.”
This Comment focuses specifically on a court’s power to exercise its
authority over an individual—personal jurisdiction. A valuable
explanation of the concept of personal jurisdiction in its early stage
of development comes from the 1877 Supreme Court case Pennoyer v.
8
Neff. The Court in Pennoyer explained that a person would not be
bound by a court’s judgment unless the court had properly obtained
6

See J. McIntyre Mach. Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2793 (2011) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (explaining the challenges that the Internet poses to personal
jurisdiction analysis).
7
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 928 (9th ed. 2009).
8
See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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power over that individual by statute and under the Constitution. In
1877, most state statutes provided that a court properly obtained
power over an individual when that individual was either: (1) served
with process within the territory of the state; or (2) voluntarily
10
appeared to litigate in the state. The Court in Pennoyer brought
personal jurisdiction analysis within the confines of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, stating that “proceedings in a
court of justice to determine the personal rights and obligations of
parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction do not constitute
11
due process of law.”
As the United States began to grow and develop technologically,
the expansion of interstate commerce and travel began to pose
significant problems for courts trying to apply principles from
12
Pennoyer. Many states responded by finding creative ways to assert
jurisdiction. One common example was for a state to pass a statute
declaring that any individual driving on state highways consents to
13
have the state appoint an agent for service of process. In Hess v.
Pawloski, the Supreme Court explained that in order to be valid, these
14
statutes must be consistent with the Due Process Clause. Then, in
1945, the Supreme Court clarified this principle when it articulated a
test for establishing personal jurisdiction over non-consenting, out-of15
state defendants in International Shoe Co. v. Washington. The Court
established this more flexible test based on a defendant’s “minimum
contacts” with the forum state and the reasonableness of subjecting
the defendant to the forum state’s jurisdiction based on those
16
contacts. It also explained that it adopted this test to get rid of the
“legal fiction” that defendants were impliedly consenting to
jurisdiction by their “presence in the state through the acts of its
17
authorized agents.” The Court found this test to be in accordance
18
with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
It

9

Id. at 732.
Id. at 729–30.
11
Id. at 733.
12
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292–93 (1980)
(noting that a change in personal jurisdiction jurisprudence is attributable to a
“fundamental transformation in the American economy”).
13
See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 354 (1927); Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S.
160, 164 (1916).
14
Hess, 274 U.S. at 355.
15
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
16
Id. at 316.
17
Id. at 318.
18
Id. at 319.
10
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stated that “due process requires only that in order to subject a
defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the
territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions
19
of fair play and substantial justice.’”
In International Shoe, the Court also introduced the concepts of
general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction without expressly using
20
these terms. The Court suggested that jurisdiction would apply to
individuals and corporations with operations in a particular state that
are so “continuous and systematic” that they could reasonably be
subject to jurisdiction in that state, even for disputes that are distinct
21
from those contacts.
Nearly forty years later, in Helicopteros
Nacionales De Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, the Supreme Court identified this
22
concept explicitly as “general jurisdiction.” Recently, in Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, the Supreme Court refined the
International Shoe standard to require that the contacts be so
continuous and systematic as to render the defendant “essentially at
23
home” in the forum state. The Goodyear Court also explained that
general jurisdiction typically exists where the individual is domiciled
24
or the practical equivalent for a corporation.
While theoretically viable, the Supreme Court has only
considered the issue of whether a defendant’s contacts with a forum
state are so continuous and systematic as to subject him to general
25
jurisdiction in that state in three decisions since International Shoe.
Alternatively, specific jurisdiction is the legal principle that most
plaintiffs invoke to subject an out-of-state defendant to personal
19

Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
See id. at 318.
21
Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 318 (“[T]here have been instances in which the
continuous corporate operations within a state were thought so substantial and of
such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings
entirely distinct from those activities.”).
22
Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.9
(1984) (“When a State exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit not
arising out of or related to the defendant’s contacts with the forum, the State has
been said to be exercising ‘general jurisdiction’ over the defendant.”) (citing Calder
v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 786 (1984)); Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process
Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 80–81 (1980). Cf. Arthur
T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis,
79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1144 (1966).
23
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851
(2011).
24
Id. at 2853–54.
25
See id. at 2846; Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 408; Perkins v. Bengeut Consol. Mining
Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
20
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26

jurisdiction in a forum state. Specific jurisdiction requires that: (1)
the defendant corporation or individual have sufficient minimum
contacts with the forum state; (2) the claim against him must arise
out of or relate to those contacts; and (3) jurisdiction over the
27
defendant must be reasonable.
Perhaps the main takeaway from International Shoe is that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment allows a state to
exercise personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants, provided
that these prospective defendants have sufficient minimum contacts
with that state so that bringing the suit does not offend “traditional
28
notions of fair play and substantial justice.” In 1980, the Supreme
Court articulated four factors for determining whether the exercise
of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant is fair and
29
reasonable in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson. The factors
included: (1) “the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute”;
(2) “the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective
relief”; (3) “the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the
most efficient resolution of controversies”; and (4) “the shared
interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive
30
social policies.”
In order for the court to exercise personal
jurisdiction over non-resident defendants, however, it must have a
statutory authority granting it the ability to reach out beyond its
31
32
borders. Such statutes are widely known as “long-arm statutes,”
and in response to International Shoe, all fifty states have enacted these
statutes or court rules that define the circumstances under which the
33
state may exercise jurisdiction over non-resident defendants. These
26

See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2849 (explaining that most of the Court’s decisions
have focused on circumstances surrounding specific jurisdiction).
27
See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 427 (“[A] court’s specific jurisdiction should be
applicable whenever the cause of action arises out of or relates to the contacts
between the defendant and the forum.”); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
318 (1945) (“Conversely it has been generally recognized that the casual presence of
the corporate agent or even his conduct of single or isolated items of activities in a
state in the corporation’s behalf are not enough to subject it to suit on causes of
action unconnected with the activities there.”).
28
See Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 323–24.
29
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
30
Id. at 292.
31
Id. at 290–93.
32
A long-arm statute is defined as “[a] statute providing for jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant who has had contacts with the territory where the statute is in
effect.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1027 (9th ed. 2009).
33
See Douglas D. McFarland, Dictum Run Wild: How Long-Arm Statutes Extended to
the Limits of Due Process, 84 B. U. L. REV. 492, 493–96 (2004) (explaining the history
and development of long-arm statutes in response to Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington).
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statutes can be as expansive as extending the jurisdictional
boundaries to the fullest extent allowable under the U.S.
34
Constitution, or limited to requiring either an act or omission to
35
36
occur within the state or business to be transacted within the state.
Assuming that individuals and corporations are not subject to
general jurisdiction, and provided that the state has a long-arm
statute granting it jurisdiction over non-resident defendants, the next
question that courts were called upon to answer was: how many
contacts would be enough to satisfy specific jurisdiction under the
“minimum contacts” test from International Shoe? The Supreme Court
addressed this issue in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., in
which an insurance company, through its regional office located in
37
Texas, sold a life insurance policy to a California man. When the
man died, the beneficiary of the policy, Ms. McGee, sued to enforce
38
the policy in California. The Supreme Court held that one contact—
the insurance contract—was sufficient to establish jurisdiction, even
though the company had no agents in California nor solicited any
business there, because the contact was substantial and the dispute
39
arose directly from that contact.
International Shoe and McGee were somewhat limited by the
40
Court’s ruling in Hanson v. Denckla.
In Hanson, a Pennsylvania
woman established a trust with a Delaware corporation and
41
subsequently moved to Florida. When she died, the beneficiaries of
the trust tried to sue the Delaware corporation in Florida to enforce
42
The Supreme Court rejected the notion that
the agreement.
Florida had personal jurisdiction over the Delaware corporation,
stating that “[t]he unilateral activity of those who claim some
relationship with a non-resident defendant cannot satisfy the

34

See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 2010) (“A court of this state may
exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state
or of the United States.”); N.J. CT. R. 4:4-4 (2010) (“[A]ny defendant may be served
as provided by court order, consistent with due process of law.”).
35
See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 801.05 (West 2010) (“A court of this state having
jurisdiction of the subject matter has jurisdiction over a person . . . [i]n any action
claiming injury to person or property within or without this state arising out of an act
or omission within this state by the defendant.”).
36
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 223A, § 3 (West 1993).
37
McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 221 (1957).
38
Id.
39
Id. at 221–23.
40
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
41
Id. at 238–39.
42
Id. at 240.
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requirement of contact with the forum state.” The Court went on to
add an additional feature to International Shoe’s minimum contacts
test, requiring “some act by which the defendant purposefully avails
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state,
44
thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.”
This new requirement of purposeful availment created another
issue for the courts as they tried to determine what type of conduct
was sufficient to find that the defendant had purposefully availed
itself of the benefits and privileges of the laws of the forum state. In
World-Wide Volkswagen, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that a
defendant purposefully avails himself of the benefits and privileges of
a forum state, merely because it is foreseeable that a product he sells
45
may end up in that state.
Another mechanism for establishing personal jurisdiction over
out-of-state defendants is often referred to as the “effects test”
46
established in Calder v. Jones. This test is relevant to this Comment
because some courts have applied it to Internet transactions
conducted through online intermediaries. In Calder, a famous singeractor Shirley Jones filed a lawsuit in California against the National
Enquirer and its writer—both located in Florida—for libel with regard
47
to a story they published about her. The Supreme Court found that
the story “concerned the California activities of a California
resident. . . . was drawn from California sources, and the brunt of the
48
harm . . . was suffered in California.” The Court also found that
petitioners “edited an article that they knew would have a potentially
devastating impact upon respondent. And they knew that the brunt
of that injury would be felt by respondent in the State in which she
lives and works and in which the National Enquirer has its largest
49
circulation.”
The Court concluded that “[j]urisdiction over
petitioners is therefore proper in California based on the ‘effects’ of
50
their Florida conduct in California.” As a result of Calder, courts
have found jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants when their
conduct is an intentional action expressly aimed at the forum state
51
and causes an injury or effect in the forum state.
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51

Id. at 253.
Id. (emphasis added).
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295–97 (1980).
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
Id. at 784.
Id. at 788–89.
Id. at 789–90 (emphasis added).
Id. at 789.
See, e.g., IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 256 (3d Cir. 1998);
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In sum, the Supreme Court has articulated several elements
necessary for a state to assert personal jurisdiction over a non-resident
defendant who has not consented to its jurisdiction and does not
have continuous and systematic contacts that expose him to general
jurisdiction. First, the state must have a statutory grant of authority,
52
usually in the form of a long-arm statute. The defendant must then
have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state such that he
has purposefully availed himself of the benefits and privileges of its
53
laws. In addition, the claim against him must arise out of or relate
54
to those minimum contacts. Finally, jurisdiction over the defendant
must be reasonable such that it complies with the “traditional notions
55
of fair play and substantial justice.” This is essentially the framework
that courts have attempted to apply to personal jurisdiction cases
involving activity conducted over the Internet—an area where
territorial boundaries of Internet activity are ambiguous and an
individual’s conduct may cause an effect in one state or every state
almost instantaneously.
III. THE BEGINNING OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND THE INTERNET:
ESTABLISHING JURISDICTION OVER OWNERS AND OPERATORS OF
WEBSITES
The establishment of the Internet and e-commerce caused
significant problems for courts trying to apply the minimum contacts
test to individuals who post information and conduct business over
56
the web. Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc. was one of the first
cases to address the issue of personal jurisdiction with regard to
57
activity conducted over the Internet. In this case, plaintiff Inset, a
Connecticut
corporation, sued defendant Instruction, a
Massachusetts corporation with no employees or offices in
Connecticut, for trademark infringement based on the defendant’s
58
use of the name “Inset” in its website and phone number. The court

Pavlovich v. Super. Ct., 58 P.3d 2, 9 (Cal. 2002).
52
See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 290–91 (1980);
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 718 (1877).
53
See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
54
See Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414
(1984).
55
See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 292; Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316.
56
See J. McIntyre Mach. Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2793 (2011); Paul Schiff
Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 330–31 (2002).
57
Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
58
Id. at 163 (noting that the defendant listed its website as www.inset.com and
used the toll-free phone number 1-800-US-INSET).
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applied the traditional minimum contacts analysis and found that the
defendant had sufficient minimum contacts with Connecticut
because the defendant advertised over the Internet and through its
toll-free number, which “reach[ed] as many as 10,000 Internet users
59
within Connecticut alone.”
The court’s holding received harsh
criticism and many courts chose not to apply this test because the
underlying implication was that anyone advertising over the Internet
could be subject to jurisdiction anywhere the website could be
60
accessed.
The next case to address the issue of personal jurisdiction with
regard to Internet communications and transactions was Zippo
Manufacturing. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., which adopted a more
61
restrictive approach.
In Zippo, a Pennsylvania manufacturing
company sued a California Internet news service in Pennsylvania for
trademark infringement based on its use of the name “Zippo” for its
62
websites. The court aptly articulated the issue before it, stating, “we
must decide the Constitutionally permissible reach of Pennsylvania’s
63
Long Arm Statute . . . through cyberspace.”
The court then
reviewed the traditional principles of personal jurisdiction and found
that “the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally
exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of
64
commercial activity.”
In its decision, the court articulated a sliding-scale test for
determining whether an individual purposefully avails himself of a
65
forum state based on his or her conduct over the Internet. On one
end of the spectrum are active websites where individuals enter into
contracts and conduct business with residents of foreign
66
jurisdictions.
On the other end are passive websites where
individuals merely post information that is accessible to others in
67
foreign jurisdictions. In the middle lie “interactive websites” where
information is exchanged between the host computer and users of

59

Id. at 165.
See, e.g., Vinten v. Jeantot Marine Alliances, S.A., 191 F. Supp. 2d 642, 647 n.10
(D.S.C. 2002); Digital Control, Inc. v. Boretronics, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1186
(W.D. Wash. 2001).
61
Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
62
Id. at 1121.
63
Id. at 1120–21.
64
Id. at 1123–24 (emphasis added).
65
Id. at 1124.
66
Id.
67
Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
60
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68

the website. The court indicated that jurisdiction over out-of-state
defendants who maintain “active” websites would be proper, whereas
jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants who maintain “passive”
69
websites would not. With regard to “interactive” websites, courts
would determine jurisdiction “by examining the level of interactivity
and commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs
70
on the Web site.”
The court explained that personal jurisdiction jurisprudence
supports the notion that when individuals and corporations
intentionally reach out to conduct business with residents of other
states, jurisdiction in those states is proper, and this rationale should
not change simply because the business is conducted over the
71
Internet. Conversely, the court stated that an out-of-state defendant
does not “purposefully avail” himself of the benefits and privileges of
the laws of the forum state because users must take it upon
themselves to act upon that information, by calling the number on
72
the site, for example. Additionally, the court cited Maritz, Inc. v.
Cybergold, Inc. as an example of a case involving an “interactive
website,” and relied on that court’s reasoning that the defendant’s
website’s active solicitations, promotional activities, and responses to
73
users accessing the site made jurisdiction proper.
Applying this test to the case before it, the district court found
that the defendant’s Internet news service websites were akin to
“active” websites because they conducted substantial business over the
Internet and provided passwords to “approximately 3,000 subscribers
in Pennsylvania and entered into seven contracts with Internet access
74
providers . . . in Pennsylvania.” Next, the court concluded that the
claim arose out of the defendant’s conduct in Pennsylvania because
“both a significant amount of the alleged infringement and dilution,
75
and resulting injury . . . occurred in Pennsylvania.” Lastly, the court
held that jurisdiction was reasonable in Pennsylvania because of
Pennsylvania’s interest in adjudicating disputes over infringement of
trademarks owned by its residents and the plaintiff’s interest in

68

Id.
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id. (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)).
72
Id. at 1125 (citing Bensusan Res. Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 297
(S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
73
Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124–25.
74
Id. at 1126.
75
Id. at 1127.
69
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76

choosing to seek relief in the state. Accordingly, the court found
77
that Pennsylvania had specific jurisdiction over the defendant.
Many district and circuit courts have embraced some variation of
the sliding-scale test articulated in Zippo, and some have even gone
further to incorporate the requirement that defendants “expressly
78
aim” or “target” the forum state through their Internet activities.
Other courts have criticized the Zippo sliding-scale test or declined to
79
apply it in favor of traditional personal jurisdiction analysis.
Admittedly, the Pennsylvania District Court’s holding in Zippo was
generally tailored to entities that run their own websites and use
those websites to conduct business or to post information and
80
advertisements. The question that still remains, which has haunted
courts since the beginning of the twenty-first century, is what happens
when the entity does not own the website itself, but instead conducts
business or posts information over a website owned and operated by a
third-party intermediary, such as eBay?
IV. THE ISSUE OF ONLINE INTERMEDIARIES: ESTABLISHING PERSONAL
JURISDICTION OVER INDIVIDUALS WHO CONDUCT BUSINESS OVER EBAY
This Part will discuss cases that have used the Zippo sliding-scale
test, the traditional minimum contacts test, or a variation of the
Calder effects test to determine whether personal jurisdiction is
appropriate over entities that conduct business through eBay as a
third-party intermediary.
When individuals and corporations
conduct business through online intermediaries like eBay, it is
especially difficult for courts to determine when a state will have
personal jurisdiction over these entities.
The conventional
problems—such as lack of territorial boundaries for where the online
activity or effect thereof takes place and the ability of an entity to
make contact with every state instantaneously—are also present when
81
entities choose to conduct business via online intermediaries.
76

Id.
Id.
78
See, e.g., ALS Scan Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 714 (4th
Cir. 2002); Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 1999); see also A.
Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction and the Internet: Returning to the Traditional Principles to
Analyze Network-Mediated Contacts, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 74 (2006) (analyzing cases
that have applied the Zippo sliding-scale test to establish personal jurisdiction over
the Internet).
79
See, e.g., Instabook Corp. v. Instantpublisher.com., 469 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1124–
25 (M.D. Fla. 2006); Howard v. Mo. Bone and Joint Ctr., Inc., 869 N.E.2d 207, 212
(Ill. App. Ct. 2007).
80
See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1125–26.
81
See Arthur R. Miller, The Emerging Law of the Internet, 38 GA. L. REV. 991, 995–96
77
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Additionally, since these entities do not own the websites through
which they conduct their business, they pose separate problems for
courts trying to apply the Zippo sliding-scale test. Courts that have
addressed the issue of whether personal jurisdiction exists over outof-state defendants conducting business through online
intermediaries usually do so in the context of breach of contract,
82
fraud, or misrepresentation claims.
The archetypical eBay controversy is as follows: seller S puts a
listing up on eBay indicating that a particular item is for sale for a
83
particular period of time. Along with this listing, S provides a brief
description of the item, usually indicating the quality of its condition,
any special features the product might have, and anything else a
84
potential buyer might wish to know about the product. Buyers B, C,
and D then all post “bids” on the item indicating how much they are
85
willing to pay for the item. At the end of the sale period, buyer B
86
has the highest bid on the item and wins the auction. S and B then
arrange to have the product delivered to B’s home, or alternatively, B
87
agrees to travel to S to pick up the item. When B takes possession of
the item, the product is not as B expected it to be, based on S’s
88
description (or misrepresentation). B files a lawsuit against S for
breach of contract (or fraud) in B’s home state and S argues that the
89
court lacks personal jurisdiction.
State and district courts
throughout the United States have addressed this situation
specifically, and others very similar to it, and have either tried to
apply the traditional minimum contacts approach, the sliding-scale
test in Zippo, or the effects test articulated in Calder.
(2004).
82
See, e.g., Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 2008); Metcalf v.
Lawson, 802 A.2d 1221, 1224 (N.H. 2002). But cf. Winfield Collection Ltd. v.
McCauley, 105 F. Supp. 2d 746, 747 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (providing an example of a
copyright infringement case based on an eBay transaction).
83
See, e.g., Foley v. Yacht Mgmt. Grp., Inc., No. 08-7254, 2009 WL 2020776, at *1
(N.D. Ill. July 9, 2009).
84
See, e.g., Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1014.
85
See, e.g., Karstetter v. Voss, 184 S.W.3d 396, 400 (Tex. App. 2006) (explaining
that out of fifty-seven bids, plaintiff was the highest bidder).
86
See, e.g., Hinners v. Robey, 336 S.W.3d 891, 893 (Ky. 2011).
87
See Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1014 (noting that plaintiff hired a transport company
to deliver car from defendant’s home state of Wisconsin to plaintiff’s home state of
California); Metcalf, 802 A.2d at 1224 (noting that plaintiff buyer traveled to
defendant’s home state of New Jersey to purchase excavator).
88
See, e.g., Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1015.
89
See, e.g., id. at 1014; Erwin v. Piscitello, 627 F. Supp. 2d 855, 857 (E.D. Tenn.
2007); Crummey v. Morgan, 965 So. 2d 497, 499 (La. Ct. App. 2007), writ denied, 967
So. 2d 509 (La. 2007).
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A. Courts Applying the Zippo Sliding-Scale Test
In Dedvukaj v. Maloney, the District Court for the Eastern District
of Michigan applied the Zippo sliding-scale test to answer the question
of when personal jurisdiction is proper over an out-of-state defendant
who conducted business through an online intermediary, such as
90
eBay. In Dedvukaj, the plaintiff, a resident of Michigan, sued the
defendant, a resident of New York and sole member of “Mr.
Markdown L.L.C.,” for breach of contract after the plaintiff
successfully bid on two pieces of artwork that defendant failed to
91
provide. In the defendant’s listing under the general information
heading, he listed the “item location” as “Upstate NY, United States”
and under the “ships to” heading, he listed “United States, Canada,
92
Europe, Asia, [and] Australia.” The defendant also provided a tollfree number in the listing for interested buyers to call for more
93
information.
The auctions lasted several weeks, and during this
time, the plaintiff received email updates about the status of the items
94
Additionally, the plaintiff spoke with the
and the bids entered.
defendant using the toll-free number posted on the listing about the
95
authenticity of the paintings.
The court determined that Michigan’s long-arm statute allowed
for jurisdiction and applied the sliding-scale test articulated in Zippo
to establish the purposeful availment prong of the minimum contacts
96
analysis. The court prefaced its analysis by explaining the need for
an expansive view of personal jurisdiction with regard to transactions
97
through online intermediaries :
Internet forums such as eBay expand the seller’s market
literally to the world and sellers know that, and avail
themselves of this greatly expanded marketplace. It should,
in the context of these commercial relationships, be no
great surprise to sellers—and certainly no unfair burden to
them—if, when a commercial transaction formed over and
through the internet does not meet a buyer’s expectations,
they might be called upon to respond in a legal forum in
90

Dedvukaj v. Maloney, 447 F. Supp. 2d 813 (E.D. Mich. 2006). The plaintiff
sued the individual defendant and his business, however, for the purposes of this
Comment, they will be referred to as one singular defendant.
91
Id. at 816–17.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 817.
95
Id. at 816.
96
Dedvukaj, 447 F. Supp. 2d at 820.
97
Id.
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the buyer’s home state. Sellers cannot expect to avail
themselves of the benefit of the internet-created world
market that they purposefully exploit and profit from
without accepting the concomitant legal responsibilities
98
that such an expanded market may bring with it.
The court then explained why the sliding-scale test in Zippo is
appropriate to establish the purposeful availment element of the
99
minimum contacts test. It determined that online-intermediary sites
could be categorized as interactive, because sellers can determine the
terms of the sale and post descriptions and pictures of the items for
100
sale. Additionally, buyers can communicate with other buyers and
sellers by posting on the listing, and buyers make payments to the
101
seller in exchange for the item.
Applying this test to the case before it, the court found that the
defendant had purposefully availed himself of the benefits and
102
privileges of conducting business in Michigan. The court reasoned
that the defendant communicated with plaintiff frequently via email
and telephone about the listing, uploaded pictures and descriptions
of his items, indicated that he would sell anywhere in the United
States and in many countries, accepted payment from Michigan, and
103
was a sophisticated and extensive user of eBay.
The court then
went on to find that the remaining elements of the minimum
104
contacts test were met. The court determined that the lawsuit arose
out of and was related to the eBay transaction, and jurisdiction over
the defendant was reasonable because the defendant’s connection
with Michigan was substantial and the state had an interest in
105
protecting its citizens from fraud and misrepresentation.
Accordingly, the court found that Michigan had personal jurisdiction
106
over the defendant.
A review of other decisions where courts have applied the
sliding-scale test from Zippo provides insight as to relevant factors that
go toward determining the level of interactivity needed to establish
the purposeful availment element and whether jurisdiction over the
defendant is reasonable. Federal and state courts applying the Zippo
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106

Id.
See id.
Id. at 821.
Id.
Dedvukaj, 447 F. Supp. 2d at 821.
Id. at 822.
Id. at 823.
Id.
Id.
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sliding-scale test to determine whether personal jurisdiction is
appropriate in these situations have ruled both for and against
107
First, in Crummey v. Morgan, a Louisiana appellate
defendants.
court found that the defendant’s interactivity through electronic
communications was sufficient to establish jurisdiction in Louisiana,
where the defendant accepted payment from a Louisiana credit card,
provided potential buyers with a telephone number, engaged in
additional conversations with buyers, and used the post to “advertise,
108
puff, negotiate, and accept payment.” The court also indicated an
important public policy rationale for finding that personal
109
jurisdiction exists over these defendants. The court theorized that
holding otherwise would have a chilling effect on e-commerce
because buyers, wary of having to litigate in the home courts of outof-state sellers, “will refrain from purchasing goods on eBay . . .
should the merchandise they considered purchasing be defective or
110
otherwise not conform to the advertised online representations.”
Second, in Hinners v. Robey, the Supreme Court of Kentucky also
applied the sliding-scale test from Zippo, but it determined that it
could not establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant eBay seller
111
from Missouri.
In Hinners, a Kentucky plaintiff bid on and
ultimately won the auction for a Cadillac Escalade that the Missouri
112
defendant had put up for sale. The defendant’s listing stated that
the Cadillac had no prior accident damage, no electrical problems,
113
and was in good condition.
The plaintiff traveled to Missouri to
114
Shortly
complete the deal and acquire possession of the vehicle.
after returning to Kentucky with the vehicle, the plaintiff began
having problems with the electrical system and took it to a mechanic
who discovered that there had been extensive work done on the car
115
due to prior collisions. The plaintiff filed suit against the defendant
in Kentucky for fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of

107

See infra Part IV.A.
Crummey v. Morgan, 965 So. 2d 497, 504 (La. Ct. App. 2007), writ denied, 967
So. 2d 509 (La. 2007).
109
See id.
110
Id.
111
Hinners v. Robey, 336 S.W.3d 891, 901 (Ky. 2011) (the court considered the
issue under both the sliding-scale test articulated in Zippo and under the traditional
minimum contacts analysis and came to the same conclusion; however, for the
purpose of this Part only the Zippo analysis is discussed).
112
Id. at 893.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 894.
115
Id.
108
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warranty, and the Supreme Court of Kentucky granted certification.
The Kentucky Supreme Court applied the sliding-scale test from
Zippo and found that the defendant did not purposefully avail himself
117
of the privileges of Kentucky.
The court explained that the
defendant “did not limit the auction to bidders from Kentucky or
target his advertisement to Kentucky residents, and in fact could not
know the resident state of the successful bidder until the auction was
118
complete.”
It stated that the eBay listing was akin to a “passive
Internet website” that “does little more than make information
119
available to those who are interested.”
Also relevant to its
conclusion was the fact that the delivery of the item was concluded
120
outside of Kentucky.
Based on this analysis, the court ultimately
concluded that to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant
121
would be constitutionally improper.
Perhaps the most important thing to take away from these cases
is their use of the sliding-scale test to assess the purposeful availment
aspect of the minimum contacts test. As discussed supra in Part II,
combining the analysis from McGee v. Int’l. Life Ins. Co. and Hanson v.
Denckla, one contact may be sufficient to establish personal
jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant if the contact is substantial,
and the defendant purposefully avails himself of the benefits and
122
privileges of the forum state through that contact. These cases also
illustrate that courts can apply the Zippo sliding-scale test to
transactions conducted over online intermediaries to establish the
purposeful availment prong of the traditional minimum contacts test,
while still maintaining the other traditional elements of establishing
123
personal jurisdiction.
Each of these cases also required that the
claim arise out of or relate to the eBay transaction and for
jurisdiction over the defendants to be reasonable.
Importantly, in Hinners the court listed relevant factors in

116

Id. at 893.
Hinners, 336 S.W.3d at 899.
118
Id.
119
Id. at 901.
120
See id. at 894 n.3 (“There is some indication in the record that delivery and
execution of the paperwork may have occurred in Illinois; however, the relevant
point is that the delivery was completed beyond the borders of Kentucky, and
whether it was in Missouri or Illinois is of no significance.”).
121
Id. at 903.
122
See discussion supra Part II; see also McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220,
221–23 (1958); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
123
See Dedvukaj v. Maloney, 447 F. Supp. 2d 813, 819 (E.D. Mich. 2006); Hinners,
336 S.W.3d at 898; Crummey v. Morgan, 965 So. 2d 497, 501–02 (La. Ct. App. 2007).
117
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considering whether the defendant had purposefully availed himself
124
The court stated that
of the benefits and privileges of Kentucky.
since the seller did not “limit the auction to bidders from Kentucky,”
could not know that the winning bidder was a resident of the state of
Kentucky, did not select the winning bidder, and completed the
delivery outside of Kentucky, the defendant did not purposefully avail
himself of the benefits and privileges of conducting business in
125
Kentucky.
Similarly, in Crummey the court listed relevant factors
supporting its finding that the defendant had purposefully availed
126
himself of the benefits and privileges of Louisiana.
The court
found that since the defendant expanded his market by using eBay as
an intermediary, accepted an original down payment for the vehicle
with a credit card sent from Louisiana, and provided the plaintiff with
a telephone number to engage in additional communications with
the defendant, he purposefully availed himself of the protections of
127
Louisiana law.
Again, in Dedvukaj the court also listed the factors it considered
relevant to determining that defendant had purposefully availed
128
himself of the benefits and privileges of Michigan.
In making its
decision, the court considered the fact that the defendant stated that
he would deliver his paintings anywhere in the United States, that the
defendant provided the plaintiff with a phone number and email
address in order to contact him, and that he provided his own terms
129
and conditions, logos, and marketing information in the listing.
These cases effectively illustrate which factors courts will consider as
relevant to determining whether an out-of-state defendant who
conducts business through an online intermediary has purposefully
availed himself of the benefits and privileges of a forum state in order
130
to establish personal jurisdiction over that defendant.
B. Courts Applying Traditional Minimum Contacts Analysis
Some courts, however, have refused to abandon the traditional
approach in resolving the issue of whether personal jurisdiction exists
over an out-of-state defendant conducting business through an online
intermediary.
The Ninth Circuit applied traditional personal
124
125
126
127
128
129
130

See Hinners, 336 S.W.3d at 894 n.4, 899–900.
Id.
See Crummey, 965 So. 2d at 504.
Id.
Dedvukaj, 447 F. Supp. 2d at 822.
Id.
See discussion infra Part V.
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jurisdiction analysis in resolving this issue in Boschetto v. Hansing. In
Boschetto, the plaintiff, a California resident, used eBay to purchase an
132
The
antique car from the defendant, a resident of Wisconsin.
parties communicated through email and arranged to deliver the car
133
to California from Wisconsin.
Upon receiving the car, Boschetto
realized that the car was not the specific “R Code” model that the
defendant advertised and found other significant problems with the
134
engine and body of the car.
Boschetto subsequently sued the
135
The
defendant in California for breach of contract and fraud.
court expressly stated that the sliding-scale test articulated in Zippo
was inapplicable in this type of situation because the defendant did
136
not own or operate the eBay website.
The court equated the eBay listing to an advertisement, stating
that “the eBay listing was not part of broader e-commerce activity; the
listing temporarily advertised a good for sale and that listing closed
once the item was sold, thereby extinguishing the Internet contact
for this transaction within the forum state (and every other
137
forum).” Thus, the court applied the traditional minimum contacts
analysis articulated in International Shoe to the online transaction and
found that defendant’s one sale over eBay to the California plaintiff
was not a sufficient contact to allow the court to exercise personal
138
jurisdiction over the defendant. The court did note, however, that
a defendant who conducts business over eBay might be subject to
personal jurisdiction in a forum state when he uses eBay “as a means
for establishing regular business with a remote forum such that
finding personal jurisdiction comports with traditional notions of fair
139
play and substantial justice.”
One potential benefit of the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Boschetto
is that it is consistent with traditional long-range transactions that do
not involve the Internet, and courts can look to case law that
addressed these situations for support and guidance as to how much
contact with the forum state is sufficient. The court’s holding,
however, poses a number of potential problems as well. First, if the
defendant was actually wrong and made a number of
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139

Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d. 1011 (9th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1014.
Id.
Id. at 1015.
Id. at 1014–15.
Id. at 1018.
Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1018.
Id. at 1020.
Id. at 1019 (internal quotations omitted).
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misrepresentations in the description of the vehicle, the plaintiff may
have no recourse, as the cost of traveling to Wisconsin to litigate may
be too burdensome for the individual plaintiff. Additionally, the
court failed to address the significance, if any, of the communication
via email that the parties exchanged in arranging the delivery of the
car to California and whether or not that communication may
contribute towards the defendant’s minimum contacts with
California.
Once again, reviewing other courts that have applied the
traditional minimum contacts tests in these types of situations reveals
relevant factors that these courts consider in deciding whether the
defendant’s contacts with the state are sufficient and whether it is
reasonable to subject the defendant to jurisdiction. Federal and state
courts in other jurisdictions following this approach have generally
found that the contacts through the online intermediaries were
insufficient to establish jurisdiction, describing them as attenuated,
140
random, and fortuitous. Notably, many of these courts rely on the
fact that the defendant has “no control over the winning bidder,” and
as a result, the contact with the forum state is random and
141
fortuitous.
This view, however, ignores reality. In fact, sellers are
able to control who (or at least where) the winning bidder will be.
Sellers are able to control the information that is posted in the
“description” and “shipping and payments” sections of their listings
142
on eBay. Sellers may choose which forum states they will agree to
143
Most sellers,
ship to and with whom they will conduct business.
however, seek to maximize the number of potential buyers and
increase the sale price of their item, intentionally choosing to avail
themselves of the benefits of conducting business with every state.
At least one court has applied the traditional minimum contacts
test to an out-of-state defendant conducting business over eBay and
144
found that personal jurisdiction was appropriate.
In Malcolm v.
Esposito, the plaintiff, a Virginia resident, won an auction to purchase
a car on eBay from the defendants, agents of a car dealership located

140

See, e.g., Winfield Collection, Ltd. v. McCauley, 105 F. Supp. 2d 746, 751 (E.D.
Mich. 2000); Foley v. Yacht Mgmt. Grp., Inc., No. 08-7254, 2009 WL 2020776, at *3–4
(N.D. Ill. July 9, 2009); MacNeil v. Trambert, 932 N.E.2d 441, 446 (Ill. App. Ct.
2010).
141
See Payment & Shipping, EBAY.COM, http://pages.ebay.com/help/pay/shippingcosts.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2013).
142
See id.
143
See id.
144
Malcolm v. Esposito, 63 Va. Cir. 440, 446 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2003).
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145

in Connecticut.
After the auction ended, the parties contacted
each other by email and phone and the defendants arranged to ship
146
the car from California to Virginia. Before the defendants shipped
the car, the plaintiff discovered a manufacturing defect with the car
and tried to cancel his purchase of the vehicle, but the defendants
147
refused to allow the plaintiff to revoke the agreement. The plaintiff
subsequently sued the defendants in Virginia for fraud and breach of
148
warranty.
The court first concluded that the Virginia long-arm statute
allowed the court to exercise jurisdiction over the defendants because
the “formation of the contract for sale of the [car] occurred in
149
Virginia.”
Turning to the constitutional inquiry, the court found
that the Zippo sliding-scale analysis was not “particularly instructive”
because it primarily dealt with defendants who operate and conduct
150
transactions through their own website.
Accordingly, the court
151
applied the traditional minimum contacts analysis. The court listed
several factors that were relevant to its decision: (1) the defendants
were commercial sellers of the item and had conducted over 213
transactions to many different states through eBay; (2) the
defendants represented that they had eBay customers locally,
nationally, and internationally; (3) the defendants anticipated
transactions with out-of-state buyers because they sent an email to the
plaintiffs requesting a copy of the plaintiff’s driver’s license if he was
an out-of-state resident; and (4) the nature of the product, an
152
automobile, was intended to be delivered to and driven in Virginia.
Based on an analysis of these factors under the traditional minimum
contacts test, the court found that jurisdiction over the defendants in
153
Virginia was proper.

145

Id. at 441.
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id. at 442–43 (“The Virginia long-arm statute provides, in pertinent part, that
“(A) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by
an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the person’s . . . (2) Contracting to
supply services or things in this Commonwealth.”).
150
Malcolm, 63 Va. Cir. at 445.
151
Id. at 444–46.
152
Id. at 446.
153
Id. at 444, 446.
146

ROJAO (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

5/28/2013 2:02 PM

COMMENT

1095

C. Courts Applying the Calder Effects Test
At least one court has attempted to apply an effects test similar
to the one in Calder to determinations of personal jurisdiction over
out-of-state defendants who conduct business through online
154
intermediaries.
In Erwin v. Piscitello, the plaintiff, a resident of
Tennessee, purchased a classic automobile advertised as being in
155
“mint condition” from the defendant, a resident of Texas.
The
plaintiff and the defendant made and received several calls about the
car, during which the defendant reinforced the quality and condition
156
of the car.
The defendant ultimately delivered the car to the
157
plaintiff in Tennessee through his own driver and car hauler. Two
days after the plaintiff received the car, he discovered it was not in
mint condition and several of the original parts had been replaced,
158
contrary to the defendant’s representations.
The court first explained that Tennessee’s long-arm statute
allowed for personal jurisdiction to the full extent allowable under
the United States Constitution and as a result merged the
159
constitutional and statutory analyses.
The court then applied an
effects test and concluded that the defendant had purposefully
160
availed himself of the benefits and privileges of Tennessee’s laws.
The court found that the defendant “knowingly interacted with a
Tennessee resident” and persuaded the plaintiff to purchase the
vehicle based on representations about the vehicle that were
161
ultimately discovered to be untrue.
In doing so, the court
emphasized that “[the defendant’s] knowing and intentional conduct
162
caused foreseeable ill effects in-state.”
Based on these factual
determinations, the court concluded that it was “reasonably
foreseeable for Defendant to be haled into court in Tennessee when
163
the transaction soured.”
Most courts have chosen not to discuss whether an effects test is
applicable in the context of Internet transactions through online
164
Instead, these courts have chosen to
intermediaries like eBay.
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164

See generally Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
Erwin v. Piscitello, 627 F. Supp. 2d 855, 856–57 (E.D. Tenn. 2007).
Id. at 856.
Id. at 857.
Id.
Id. at 858–59.
Id. at 860.
Erwin, 627 F. Supp. 2d at 860.
Id. at 861.
Id.
See, e.g., Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1018–20 (9th Cir. 2008);
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address this issue under the Zippo sliding-scale analysis or under the
165
At least one court has
traditional minimum contacts analysis.
explicitly declined to follow the analysis set forth in Erwin in the
context of establishing personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state
166
defendant who conducts business through an online intermediary.
Additionally, the court in MacNeil v. Trambert discussed the difficulty
of trying to apply the effects test to Internet transactions over online
167
intermediaries like eBay. First, the court indicated that the “effects
doctrine” is generally applied to intentional tort cases, and thus is
168
inapplicable to breach-of-contract cases in the eBay context.
This
means that the effects test would only be applicable to fraud and
169
misrepresentation cases. Next, the court pointed out the difficulty
in establishing the location of the tortious act in a multi-state
transaction, whether it occurs when the defendant accepts payment
for the defective good or when the plaintiff obtains possession of the
170
defective good.
Consequently, if the plaintiff chooses to pick up
the defective good in the defendant’s state, or authorizes an agent to
do so, the location of the acceptance of payment and deliverance of
171
possession would both be in the defendant’s state. As a result, the
plaintiff would have no recourse in his own state and would have to
travel to the defendant’s state to file his lawsuit.
Currently, Erwin is the only case that has used the effects test to
find personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant conducting
business through online intermediaries. Although it is only one case,
Erwin illustrates that an effects test remains a viable option for courts
to consider in determining whether personal jurisdiction exists over
an individual who conducts business over eBay or some other online
intermediary. But as the court in MacNeil pointed out, applying this
test in the context of Internet transactions through online
intermediaries can be problematic. Until courts adopt a more
uniform standard for establishing personal jurisdiction under these
circumstances, courts will continue to struggle in determining which
analysis to apply and which factors are relevant to assessing the
reasonableness of jurisdiction.
Dedvukaj v. Maloney, 447 F. Supp. 2d 813, 819–21 (E.D. Mich. 2006); Crummey v.
Morgan, 965 So. 2d 497, 503–04 (La. Ct. App. 2007).
165
See supra Part IV.A–B.
166
See Hinners v. Robey, 336 S.W.3d 891, 903 (Ky. 2011).
167
See MacNeil v. Trambert, 932 N.E.2d 441, 447–48 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
168
Id. at 447.
169
Id.
170
See id. at 447–48.
171
See id. at 448.
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V. THE “ONLINE INTERMEDIARIES TEST”
A review of the existing commentary on this issue illustrates that,
just like the courts, scholars and commentators disagree about what
172
the proper test should be under these circumstances.
Some
commentators argue that courts should stick to the traditional
minimum contacts analysis for long-range transactions and not get
distracted by the fact that the business was conducted over the
173
Internet on the eBay website.
One commentator suggested that
state legislatures should amend their respective state’s long-arm
statutes to preclude personal jurisdiction over out-of-state residents
who conduct business over third-party websites such as eBay and
174
Amazon.
Other commentators have suggested that general
175
jurisdiction could apply to the actual websites of eBay or Amazon.
In line with this argument is the question of whether these websites’
most prominent users could also be subject to general jurisdiction if
through these online intermediaries, they have continuous and
systematic contacts with every state in the United States. This would
mean that jurisdiction would be proper over these “super-sellers” in
any state where a buyer files a claim against them. No commentator,
however, has argued in favor of creating a specific test for online
intermediaries by incorporating a modification of the Zippo slidingscale test along with elements of the traditional minimum contacts
test.
An analysis of the relevant case law on establishing personal
jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants who conduct business
through online intermediaries makes clear that the best test for
establishing personal jurisdiction is one that combines and
176
implements the most important elements of the prevalent cases.
The following online-intermediary test combines many elements
177
from the cases previously mentioned.
First, it applies principles
from the Zippo sliding-scale test and looks at the interactivity and
features of the bid, post, or listing on the online intermediary to
determine whether the defendant has purposefully availed himself of
172

See discussion infra Part V.
See, e.g., Personal Jurisdiction—Minimum Contacts Analysis—Ninth Circuit Holds
that Single Sale on eBay Does Not Provide Sufficient Minimum Contacts with Buyer’s State.—
Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2008), 122 HARV. L. REV. 1014, 1021
(2009).
174
Ryan T. Holte, What is Really Fair: Internet Sales and the Georgia Long-Arm Statute,
10 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 567, 589 (2009).
175
See Miller, supra note 81.
176
See discussion supra Parts IV.A–C.
177
See discussion supra Part IV.
173
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178

the forum state.
Then, it maintains the requirements of the
minimum contacts test that the conflict must (1) arise out of or relate
to the transaction; and (2) that jurisdiction over the defendant must
179
be reasonable.
180
The most fluent articulation of this test, derived from Dedvukaj,
181
182
Hinners, and Crummey is as follows: an out-of-state defendant who
conducts business over a third-party intermediary, such as eBay or
Amazon, is subject to personal jurisdiction in a forum state when: (1)
that defendant has sufficient minimum contacts whereby he
purposefully avails himself of the benefits and privileges of the state
as determined by the level of interactivity available to potential buyers
in the forum state through the listing; (2) the claim against him arises
out of those contacts; and (3) after an analysis of the relevant factors,
jurisdiction over the defendant is reasonable such that it complies
with the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. The
unique aspect of this approach derives from determining whether the
defendant purposefully avails himself of the forum state by looking at
the interactivity of the post or listing on the online intermediary
itself. As previously mentioned, eBay users and users of similar
online intermediaries have a significant amount of control over the
information they post in their listing and how the transaction is
183
ultimately concluded.
The more passive the seller is in posting
information, arranging for shipping, and soliciting potential buyers
in various states through his or her listing, the less likely the
defendant will have purposefully availed himself of a forum state
where his product is ultimately sold and vice versa.
In all of the cases where courts have struggled to determine
whether personal jurisdiction can be established over an out-of-state
defendant that conducts business through an online intermediary,
these courts have mentioned several factors that are considered
184
relevant to the inquiry.
After reviewing these cases, it is now
possible to determine which factors courts cite most frequently and
178

Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa.

1997).
179

See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317–19 (1945).
Dedvukaj v. Maloney, 447 F. Supp. 2d 813 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
181
Hinners v. Robey, 336 S.W.3d 891 (Ky. 2011).
182
Crummey v. Morgan, 965 So. 2d 497 (La. Ct. App. 2007).
183
See discussion supra Part IV.B.
184
See, e.g., Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1018–20 (9th Cir. 2008); Erwin
v. Piscitello, 627 F. Supp. 2d 855, 860–61 (E.D. Tenn. 2007); MacNeil v. Trambert,
932 N.E.2d 441, 446–47 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010); Malcolm v. Esposito, 63 Va. Cir. 440, 446
(Va. Cir. Ct. 2003).
180
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give the most weight to in reviewing this issue. These factors are
intended to serve as a guide for future courts reviewing this issue.
Courts that have applied one of the three articulated personal
jurisdiction tests have come to different conclusions in factually
similar cases because they differ on one or two of the factors listed
185
below.
The following factors that courts should consider in determining
whether the defendant’s bid is sufficiently interactive such that he or
she purposefully avails himself or herself of the forum state are: (1)
the number of transactions between the seller and the forum state
186
through the online intermediary; (2) whether and to what extent
the defendant coordinates and pays for the product to be shipped to
the buyer’s home state, physically or through an agent who delivers
the product to the buyer’s state, or whether the defendant requires
the buyer to come to the defendant’s state to take possession of the
187
product; (3) whether the defendant posts contact information such
as an email address, website, or telephone number in the bid and
intends to make contact with buyers in the forum state in ways other
188
than through the listing on the intermediary;
(4) whether the
defendant knows the buyer’s location, establishing that he has
189
knowledge that he is conducting business with the forum state; and
(5) whether the defendant is an individual or corporation who
190
frequently conducts business through online intermediaries.
Courts addressing the issue of out-of-state defendants conducting
business through online intermediaries have cited these factors most
frequently as relevant to its determination of personal jurisdiction.
The “reasonableness” element of the test is also an important
inquiry that courts should not overlook. The online-intermediaries
test borrows the traditional factors from World-Wide Volkswagen in
determining whether jurisdiction over the defendant would be
reasonable as to comply with the “traditional notions of fair play and
191
substantial justice.”
These factors include: (1) the burden that
185

See, e.g., Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1018–20; Erwin, 627 F. Supp. 2d at 860–61;
Dedvukaj, 447 F. Supp. 2d at 819–21; Hinners, 336 S.W.3d at 899–902; MacNeil, 932
N.E.2d at 446–47; Crummey, 965 So. 2d at 503–04; Malcolm, 63 Va. Cir. at 446 (2003).
186
See, e.g., Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1018–19; Hinners, 336 S.W.3d at 902.
187
See, e.g., Erwin, 627 F. Supp. 2d at 860–61; Dedvukaj, 447 F. Supp. 2d at 822.
188
See, e.g., Dedvukaj, 447 F. Supp. 2d at 822; MacNeil, 932 N.E.2d at 447; Crummey,
965 So. 2d at 503–04.
189
See, e.g., Erwin, 627 F. Supp. 2d at 860–61; Dedvukaj, 447 F. Supp. 2d at 822;
Crummey, 965 So. 2d at 503; Malcolm, 63 Va. Cir. at 446.
190
See, e.g., Dedvukaj, 447 F. Supp. 2d at 822; Malcolm, 63 Va. Cir. at 446.
191
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (internal
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litigation will have on the defendant; (2) the forum state’s interest in
the litigation; (3) the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief; and (4)
the national judicial interest in securing an efficient resolution of the
192
dispute.
The value of the product that forms the basis of the
transaction should also be relevant to this inquiry. The statutory
requirement that a matter must exceed $75,000 for federal diversity
jurisdiction will prevent many claims from reaching federal courts;
however, state courts should be hesitant to require a defendant to
travel across the country to defend himself over an inexpensive
193
contract dispute.
VI. APPLYING THE ONLINE INTERMEDIARIES TEST IN REAL AND
HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIOS
The following example illustrates the practicality and feasibility
of the online-intermediaries test. Consider the facts of Erwin v.
194
Piscitello. The issue of whether personal jurisdiction exists over the
defendant in Erwin can be resolved with the same outcome under the
online-intermediaries test.
In Erwin, the plaintiff viewed the
defendant’s eBay post for a car for sale and used the information in
the post to email the defendant to inquire about that car, to which
195
Had that been the full extent of the
the defendant responded.
defendant’s communications with the plaintiff, he would not have
purposefully availed himself of Tennessee law under the onlineintermediaries test. The defendant, however, chose to re-initiate
contact with the plaintiff and sent a number of emails and phone
196
calls to the plaintiff seeking to gauge his interest in the car.
Additionally, when the defendant discovered that the plaintiff would
not be able to pick the car up in Texas as previously believed, the
defendant arranged for a car hauler to deliver the car to the
197
plaintiff’s home in Tennessee. From the communications and the
fact that the seller arranged to deliver the car to Tennessee, it is
evident that the defendant knew he was dealing with a plaintiff from
198
Tennessee.
Based on these facts, the defendant in Erwin purposefully availed

quotation marks omitted).
192
Id.
193
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006).
194
See supra Part IV.C.
195
Erwin v. Piscitello, 627 F. Supp. 2d 855, 856 (E.D. Tenn. 2007).
196
Id. at 857.
197
Id.
198
See id.
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himself of the benefits and privileges of Tennessee by interacting with
the plaintiff buyer on multiple levels. The next inquiry, whether the
claim arises out of the transaction, is easily satisfied because the claim
199
arises out of the dispute over the condition of the car.
Finally,
looking at whether jurisdiction over the defendant would be
reasonable, the facts show that Tennessee has a strong interest in
protecting its citizens from fraudulent misrepresentations, that the
defendant was easily able to secure transportation for the car to
200
As a
Tennessee, and that the car was worth a substantial amount.
result, under the online-intermediaries test, personal jurisdiction over
the defendant for the dispute regarding the car would be appropriate
in Tennessee.
An alternative hypothetical example illustrates when personal
jurisdiction would not be appropriate over an out-of-state defendant
conducting business through an online intermediary. Suppose a
201
seller lists a bullwhip on eBay that Harrison Ford used to portray
202
the character “Indiana Jones” in the movie Raiders of the Lost Ark.
The defendant is a resident of New Jersey, an attorney by profession,
and has only used eBay once before to sell his mother’s fine china to
a buyer from New York. In his eBay listing, he includes a brief
description of the whip, indicating that Harrison Ford used it in the
film and stating that the buyer is responsible for pickup or delivery
and must pay all shipping costs from New Jersey. The potential buyer
is an avid movie buff who lives in Idaho and is always on the lookout
for movie relics on eBay and other auction sites. The buyer sees the
listing and decides he must have the whip. The buyer then submits a
bid for $15,000 and after one week, he wins the auction. When the
buyer receives the whip, he questions its authenticity after watching
the movie with his whip in hand. The buyer brings a lawsuit against
the seller in Idaho for breach of contract and fraud based on the
alleged misrepresentations in the eBay listing.
Through an application of the online intermediaries test, a court
in Idaho would not be able to establish personal jurisdiction over the
seller. The seller never made a sale to Idaho through eBay before,
and his previous sale of fine china to New York is not sufficient to
establish that the he is engaged in the business of selling movie relics
or fine dishware through online auction sites. The seller did not post
199

See id. at 860.
See id. at 856.
201
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 151 (10th ed. 1998) (A bullwhip
is “a rawhide whip with a very long plaited lash”).
202
RAIDERS OF THE LOST ARK (Paramount Pictures 1981).
200
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any contact information in the post indicating that he would attempt
to contact individuals by other methods other than through the eBay
listing. Additionally, he indicated that the plaintiff was responsible
for the pickup or delivery and subsequent costs of the item from New
Jersey. Even though the seller chose not to limit his sale to any
specific state but instead allowed his bullwhip to be sold anywhere in
the United States, this factor alone is not sufficient to overcome the
other factors that indicate he has not purposefully availed himself of
the benefits and privileges of Idaho. Thus, through this passive
conduct, the seller never purposefully availed himself of the benefits
and privileges of conducting business in Idaho, and therefore, he
cannot reasonably expect to be haled into court in Idaho to defend
against this lawsuit.
These examples show that courts can practically apply the
online-intermediaries test to different factual scenarios involving
transactions conducted through eBay or other online intermediaries
with relative uniformity. The more sellers choose to engage buyers in
a particular forum state through their listing and communication and
negotiation outside of the listing, the more likely they will be subject
to personal jurisdiction in that state. Conversely, the more passive
they are in listing and soliciting communication and interest from
potential buyers outside of the posts by only responding to buyer
inquiries, the less likely they will be subject to personal jurisdiction.
This test still allows sellers to exploit the benefits of selling their
products through an online intermediary such as eBay and to protect
themselves from liability in a foreign jurisdiction. It provides,
however, that if they choose to actively solicit and target customers in
a foreign state or conduct a significant amount of business with a
foreign state through that intermediary, then they cannot claim that
it is unreasonable for them to be called into court in that state. As a
result, this online intermediaries test strikes an appropriate balance
of reasonableness and fairness.
VII. CONCLUSION
Upon reviewing the relevant case law regarding personal
jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants who conduct business with
the forum state over online intermediaries, it is clear that there is a
lack of uniformity amongst courts. Notably, almost all courts have
maintained some or all of the elements of the traditional minimum
contacts analysis for determining personal jurisdiction in these
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203

cases.
Some courts have maintained all of the elements from
International Shoe Co. and applied them to these situations, with the
majority of these courts finding that one or two sales with the forum
state is insufficient to establish minimum contacts to establish
204
personal jurisdiction over the defendant seller.
Others have
applied the sliding-scale test in Zippo based on the interactivity of the
commercial business to satisfy the purposeful availment element of
205
the minimum contacts analysis. These courts have found both for
and against establishing personal jurisdiction over these defendants
based on the level of interactivity they provide in their listings and
advertisements. One court has found that if the actions of these
defendants conducting business through these online intermediaries
caused an effect in the forum state, then even one contact with the
206
forum state might be sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction.
This Comment argues for an analytical test, which combines the
two major approaches to this issue. Courts should apply the slidingscale test articulated in Zippo to determine whether the defendant has
purposefully availed himself of the benefits and privileges of the
forum state through his contacts of the sale listing. Next, courts
should determine whether the claim arises out of or relates to the
contact. Finally, these courts should determine whether jurisdiction
over the defendant would be reasonable such that it would comply
with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” based on
207
the factors articulated in World-Wide Volkswagen.
Courts and commentators have struggled with the issue of how
to assert personal jurisdiction over individuals who conduct business
over online intermediaries since immediately after the creation and
increase in popularity of third-party intermediary sites like eBay and
Amazon. This approach is a push toward uniformity in an area of
much disparity and disagreement. This “online intermediaries test”
seeks to provide guidelines for buyers and sellers conducting business
203

See, e.g., Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1018–20 (9th Cir. 2008); Erwin
v. Piscitello, 627 F. Supp. 2d 855, 860–61 (E.D. Tenn. 2007); MacNeil v. Trambert,
932 N.E.2d 441, 446–47 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010); Malcolm v. Esposito, 63 Va. Cir. 440, 446
(Va. Cir. Ct. 2003).
204
See, e.g., Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1018–19; Foley v. Yacht Mgmt. Grp., Inc., No. 087254, 2009 WL 2020776, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 2009); Winfield Collection Ltd. v.
McCauley, 105 F. Supp. 2d 746, 748–49 (E.D. Mich. 2000); Malcolm, 63 Va. Cir. at
444–46.
205
See, e.g., Dedvukaj v. Maloney, 447 F. Supp. 2d 813, 821–22 (E.D. Mich. 2006);
Metcalf v. Lawson, 802 A.2d 1221, 1225–27 (N.H. 2002); Crummey v. Morgan, 965
So. 2d 497, 503–05 (La. Ct. App. 2007), writ denied, 967 So. 2d 509 (La. 2007).
206
Erwin, 627 F. Supp. 2d at 860–62.
207
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
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over online intermediaries to know exactly where they may be called
upon in a court of law to address issues with regard to their purchases
and sales.

